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Abstract  
 
This paper introduces the concept of market design and make the distinction between the three 
different levels of market design such as industry structure, wholesale and marketplace design. We 
present a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model for the optimal long-term electricity 
planning of the Greek wholesale generation system. In order to capture more accurately the technical 
characteristics of the problem, we have divided the Greek territory into a number of individual 
interacted networks (geographical zones). In the next stage we solve the system of equations and 
provide simulation results for the daily/hourly energy prices based on the different scenarios adopted.  
The empirical findings reveal an inverted-M shaped curve for electricity demand in Greece, while 
the SMP curve is also non-linear. Lastly, given the simulations results, we provide the necessary 
policy implications for government officials, regulators and the rest of the marketers.     
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 1.  Introduction  
During the last years, there is a process in the European Union (EU) towards the integration of 
electricity markets, through market coupling and the establishment of a common Target Model. This 
is done mainly through the introduction of wholesale electricity markets (exchange type) and the 
unbundling of the traditional vertically integrated monopolies. The pioneer in the electricity sector 
reform was Chile, commencing its efforts in 1982. Since then, many EU countries (i.e. Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Belgium, etc) deregulated their electricity markets, following different 
paths. The differences in the pace and extent of market reforms are mainly related to the starting 
point of each reform and the problems associated with the internal environment of the market. This is 
more evident in Europe, where although a goal for a single market has been set back in 1996 
(Directive 96/92/EC), different levels of unbundling and introduction of competition have been 
implemented across the member states (Fiorio and Florio, 2013).  
There is a substantial body of literature estimating the optimal planning of the wholesale electricity 
market. One strand of literature tries to investigate the price responsiveness of electricity consumers, 
based on non-dynamic electricity prices neglecting demand response to real-time market prices 
(Wolak, 2011; Genc, 2016; Clastres and Khalfallah, 2015). The other strand of literature identifies 
that demand response resources may have noticeable impact on the electricity markets’ operation 
(Magnago et. al., 2015; Jiang et. al., 2014; Philpott et. al., 2000; Downward et. al., 2016; Dagoumas 
and Polemis, 2017).   
The aim of this paper is to build a MILP model that will be used mainly in order to simulate the 
daily/hourly energy prices in the Greek electricity industry. For this reason, it attempts to quantify all 
the parameters of an optimization problem, integrating a unit commitment model, which is applied in 
case of the Greek power system. The Unit Commitment (UC) problem identifies the units that will 
operate in the day-ahead electricity market based on an optimization approach that considers their 
 variable costs, their bidding strategy, the ancillary services and other technical criteria required by 
the Transmission System Operator (TSO). In order to capture more accurately the technical 
characteristics of the problem, we have divided the Greek territory into a number of individual 
interacted networks (geographical zones).optimization problem the computation of daily/hourly 
energy prices.  
This paper contributes to the relevant literature in several ways. First, our model, tries to identify the 
main determinants of the optimal planning of the wholesale electricity market. For this reason, we 
measure the impact of certain main parameters such as the selection of the power generation 
technologies, the type of fuels used in the electricity generation procedure and lastly the power plant 
locations. Second, it provides a price signal on the profitability of retailers. Third, our model 
identifies the retailers risk generated from their price responsive customers. Based on the above, it is 
worth mentioning that the Greek electricity market incorporates a complex mathematical algorithm, 
considering economic and technical characteristics. The motivation of this paper is to present the 
formulation of the Day-Ahead Scheduling (DAS) problem in the Greek mandatory wholesale 
market. We also tried to sketch some of the most important issues that market designers have to deal 
with in Greece's wholesale electricity market such as the role of imports/exports, hydro plants, 
renewable energy sources and priced demand.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the functioning of the electricity 
industry in Greece, while the mathematical formulation of the model is provided in Section 3. In 
Section 4, we present the simulation results of our energy model using different scenarios. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper offering some useful policy recommendations.  
 2.  The electricity sector in Greece   
The Greek wholesale electricity market has been organised as a pure mandatory pool since its 
inception in 2005, so as to allow competition to emerge, in a context which, however, had a severe 
 constraint. In particular, the incumbent remained dominant in both the generation and the retail 
sectors, retaining exclusive access to cheap lignite and hydro resources, while retail prices, despite 
the gradual removal of cross-subsidies, remained unlinked to wholesale prices. This combination of 
unfavourable market conditions posed severe obstacles to new entrants in the early years of market 
liberalisation, resulting in capacity shortage over the subsequent years. The Greek electricity market 
incorporates a complex mathematical algorithm, considering economic and technical characteristics. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the Greek electricity market, showing the linkages between the 
Day-ahead market and the real-time dispatch schedule. The main responsibility of the Organised 
Electricity Market (OEM) is the determination of the Day-Ahead electricity price, considering the 
energy offers and the load declarations of participants as well as the technical characteristics of the 
system. 
Figure 1: Overview of the Greek wholesale market 
 
Source: Polemis and Dagoumas, (2013) 
More specifically, the day-ahead procedure (Day Ahead Market Clearing) produces a System 
Marginal Price (SMP) for each settlement period (one hour) and a 24 hour production schedule for 
 each unit. The solution of the day-ahead procedure will be based on the co-optimization of the 
energy offers (energy market) and reserve offers (balancing market) in order to satisfy the energy 
demand and reserve requirements, while the transmission system zonal constraint mechanism will 
introduce an additional constraint. The liberalization of the electricity market and the incentives 
given by the Greek state, have led to a change in the fuel mix through the on-going penetration of 
natural gas and renewables. Moreover, the operation of the electricity market has led to re-
adjustments of the electricity tariffs, as the suppliers were in position to compete with the tariffs of 
the PPC and have taken an important share of the market. This was highly influenced by the level of 
demand. In a neoclassical market, which “obeys” the laws of demand and supply as the Greek 
electricity industry is operating, if the demand is decreased, the SMP either remains stable or is 
decreased. The decrease can be significant due to the significant difference in the variable cost (and 
consequently in the energy offers) between lignite and natural gas units. The usage of the 
interconnection capacity is also playing important role in the determination of the SMP. Therefore 
the price is highly dependent on the economic offers of the participants and on the level of the 
electricity demand. On the other hand, the electricity demand is highly influenced by the electricity 
prices.  
3.  Model  
In this section, we present the Day Ahead Scheduling (DAS) problem under a MILP framework in 
order to determine the strategic (e.g., construction of new plants, capacity expansion) and operational 
(e.g., flows of electricity and energy resources) decisions1. In order to preserve space and to enhance 
the readability of the model, the description of the variables (nomenclature) is included in the 
Appendix A (see Tables A1 and A2). 
                                                 
1 The size of the problem is rather large since it contains 50 dispatchable units (31 thermal and 19 hydro). The variables 
are calculated up to 31.000 (7.000 of them are integer) and the number of constraints up to 38.000. For 60 dispatchable 
units (20% increase) the size of the problem becomes 36.000 x 46.000 (16% x 20%), while for 75 dispatchable units 
(50% increase) the size is 42.500 x 58.000 (41% x 49%). 
 This study constitutes an integrated approach which combines a unit commitment model (MILP) 
well-grounded at an hourly level with the three distinct aspects of market design (i.e industry 
structure, wholesale and marketplace design). This approach is based on similar studies in the 
literature (Koltsakis and Georgiadis, 2015, Koltsakis et al, 2014; Koltsakis, et, al, 2015; Dagoumas 
and Polemis, 2017; Lu et al, 2018), which presented a market-based medium-term power systems 
planning model. However, this work is further extended to capture some of the most important issues 
that regulators and system operators have to deal with in Greece's wholesale electricity market such 
as the role of imports/exports, hydro plants, renewable energy sources and priced demand. 
3.1 Objective function 
In the DAS problem we face a discrete type of auction where offers and bids refer to quantities of 
energy (blocks). Thus, the objective function has to describe the maximization of the difference 
between the value of all energy blocks which demand side would pay and the amount of money that 
supply side would be paid in order to generate these energy blocks. Actually, it is the maximization 
of the difference between the demand and supply revenue streams. The maximization though is not a 
simple difference since in the market participate many players and each of them submits bids or 
offers for many energy blocks. Additionally, though all the offer and bid quantities refer to one-hour 
time period, the optimization is conducted for a wider time frame which is typically 24 hours. A 
simplified illustration of the objective function of the DAS problem is given by:   
max   
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 where energy blocks are denoted with j, demand side players with D and supply side players with S. 
Actually, the objective function is the difference between the demand and the supply PxQ products 
where P is the price and Q the quantity of each energy block within the 24- hours time frame.2 
 3.2    Model constraints 
Model constraints concern the power system as a whole and refer to issues such as load satisfaction, 
power flow congestion, exchanges with other power systems through interconnections and system 
requirements for ancillary services. These are described in the next sub sections.  
3.2.1 Load Constraints 
These constraints are formulated for each specific zone that has been defined by the corresponding 
study done by OEM. The power system is divided in geographical zones in such a way that reflects 
possible appearance of congestion in power flow. It is assumed that there are two geographical 
regions that define the zones: northern and southern Greece. Load constraints are set for both zones 
and their purpose is to express and at the same time to assure the balance between load and 
generation. These load constraints, in their general form, are expressed by the following simplified 
relation:  
(Zonal Demand – Zonal Generation + Zonal Exports – Zonal Imports) = 0            (2) 
The structure of the analytical form of these constraints is similar to the structure of the objective 
function with some differences: loss factors are applied to all load and generation quantities and 
reserve quantities for ancillary services are not included in the load constraints. The last two 
variables expressing zonal imports and exports are mutually excluded (i.e. if one of them takes a 
positive value the other is set equal to zero). 
                                                 
2 For an analytical presentation of the objective function see Appendix B.  
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3.3 Transmission Constraints 
Interzonal power flow constraints refer to the capability of the transmission lines that connect the 
zones mentioned above:  
t  2121 zz
t
zz FLx    (5) 
t  1212 zz
t
zz FLx    (6) 
Equation (5) denotes that the power flow from zone 1 (northern Greece) to zone 2 (southern Greece) 
cannot exceed a certain amount (FLz1→z2). Equation (6) denotes the same for the flow from zone 2 to 
zone 1. If the transmission constraints are activated during the Day-Ahead Scheduling procedure 
then the differential variable generation cost of each unit is used instead of the offered prices 
declared in the Injection Offers. If still the transmission constraints are activated then the problem is 
solved with these constraints on and different marginal prices are calculated for different system 
regions. 
3.3.1 System Interconnections Capacity Constraints 
These constraints are set in order to control the import and export flow regarding to the capacity of 
the interconnection transmission lines. The first constraint (Eq. 7) is set at node level. More 
specifically, it denotes that for each Dispatch Period t, the sum of all quantities to be exported from 
node m, from all exporters k, is less than or equal to the exporting capacity of the specific node 
IntCexp
t
m. Constraint (Eq. 8) expresses the same, but for a set (m*) of interconnection nodes (e.g. all 
the north interconnections). 
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where *mm  
Constraint (9) denotes that for each Dispatch Period t, the sum of all quantities to be imported from 
node m, from all importers j, is inferior to the importing capacity of the specific node IntCimp
t
m. 
Constraint (10) expresses the same, but for a set (m*) of interconnection nodes (e.g. all the north 
interconnections). 
tm,            
t
mimp
j
j
s
s
zt
j
IntCx
s

 
m
m
m
1 1
,  (9) 
tm*,   
t
mimp
j
j
s
s
zt
j
IntCx
s *
1 1
,
m
m
m 
 
          (10)  
   where *mm  
Additionally, two more constraints, (11) and (12), are set for the total exporting and importing 
capacity of the system. Constraint (11) implies that for each Dispatch Period t, the sum of all 
quantities to be exported from all nodes, from all exporters j, is less than or equal to the exporting 
capacity of the system exptsys. Respectively, constraint (12) implies that that for each Dispatch Period 
t, the sum of all quantities to be imported from all nodes, from all exporters j, is less than or equal to 
to the importing capacity of the system imptsys. 
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3.3.1 System Requirements for Ancillary Services Constraints 
The following set of constraints refers to system’s requirements for ancillary services (primary 
reserve, secondary range reserve and tertiary reserve – spinning and non spinning). 
3.4 Primary Reserve Requirements Constraints  
Constraint (13) denotes that for a specific Dispatch Period t, the sum of all reserve quantities for 
primary reserve from all units u must be equal to or greater than the system total requirement for 
primary reserve QPR
t. 
t     
t
PR
u
zt
uPR
Qx 
,
 (13) 
3.4.1 Secondary Reserve Requirements Constraints  
Constraint (15) refers to the upward reserve range for secondary control and denotes that for each 
Dispatch Period t, the sum of all reserve quantities for upward secondary reserve from all units u 
must be equal to or greater than system’s required generation increase for secondary control Q upSEC t. 
t     
tup
SEC
u
ztup
SEC Qx
u

,
  (14)   
Similarly, for the downward reserve range for secondary control constraint (15) denotes that for 
each Dispatch Period t, the sum of all reserve quantities for downward secondary reserve from all 
units u, must be equal to or greater than system’s required generation decrease for secondary 
control Q dwSEC 
t. 
t  
tdw
SEC
u
ztdw
SEC Qx u

,
 (15) 
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In that case the total generation output variations, within a Dispatch Period t, must respect system 
ramp-up and ramp-down capability. Constraint (16) implies that, for each Dispatch Period t, the 
maximum expected increase of total generation for secondary control, calculated as the sum of 
the upward secondary reserve of all generation units, must not exceed system’s ramp-up rate R 
up
sys, expressed in MW/h per 60 min.  
t  
up
sys
u
ztup
SEC Rx u

,
 (16) 
Respectively, constraint (17) denotes that, for each Dispatch Period t, the maximum expected 
decrease of total generation for secondary control, calculated as the sum of the downward 
secondary reserve of all generation units, must not exceed system’s ramp-down rate R dwsys, 
expressed in MW per 60 min. 
t  
dw
sys
u
ztdw
SEC Rx u

,
 (17) 
3.4.2 Tertiary Reserve Requirements Constraints 
Constraint (18) implies that for each Dispatch Period t, the spinning (xST) and non spinning (xNST) 
reserves of all units, for tertiary control must be equal to or greater than system’s total 
requirements for tertiary reserve QTER 
t.  
regt,  
treg
TER
u
zt
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u
zt
uST
Qxx
reg
reg
reg
reg 
,,
    (18) 
Index reg here denotes the constraint may be implemented once for the whole system or more 
than once for different sub regions of the system, for operational reasons. These sub regions are 
not identical with the zones, mentioned above which are related to transmission flow restrictions. 
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4.  Assumptions and simulation results  
This section provides assumptions and simulation results of the various scenarios under 
consideration.3 Specifically, the scenarios examined in this study concern the cases where the 
retailers’ customers are price sensitive or not. Similar to Koltsaklis and Georgiadis (2015), Koltsakis 
et al, (2016) and Dagoumas and Polemis, (2017) the problem to be addressed is concerned with the 
hourly energy balance of a specific power system including the optimal dispatch of power generating 
units (UCP). Therefore the problem under consideration is formally defined under the following 
assumptions: 
a) The scheduling period includes hourly time steps , where the electricity market operator 
determines the optimal scheduling plan for the 24 hours of the next day (day-ahead market).  
b) The power system under consideration is split into a number of subsystems . These 
subsystems are further divided into a certain number of zones  to better represent the system’s 
regional/spatial characteristics.  
c) A set of power generating units  is installed in each subsystem  (or zone ). 
This set includes thermal units , hydroelectric units , (both referred to as 
hydrothermal ones ) and renewable units . Each renewable unit  is 
characterized by a specific availability factor in each zone and time period, . Each unit 
 is characterized by a specific available power capacity .  
d) The available power capacity of each hydrothermal unit  is divided into a number of 
blocks ,  to fully represent the operational characteristics of each unit and the real 
operation of power markets. In each time period and for each power capacity block, each 
hydrothermal power generating unit provides a specific amount of energy (to be determined by the 
optimization process) at a specific price (marginal cost),  (incorporating variable operating 
                                                 
3 This mathematical problem has been solved to global optimality making use of the ILOG CPLEX 24.7.2.  
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and maintenance cost, fuel cost, and CO2 emissions cost) in order for the power demand in each 
subsystem and time period, , to be covered. Figure 2 presents the energy supply offer for a 
thermal unit u, compared to its incremental cost and its minimum variable cost, for different power 
outputs, among unit’s technical minimum  and technical maximum . 
Figure 2: Energy supply offer for a thermal unit (Euro/MWh) 
 
 
e) The same rule applies to both electricity imports from each interconnected system,  (or 
zone ), and load representatives such as power exports to other interconnected systems 
 (or zone ), and pumping load . More specifically, the power capacities of each 
interconnection  and pumping load , is divided into certain blocks (  for 
imports,  for exports, and  for pumping load), having a certain marginal cost 
 for imports, and a given bid  for exports and  for pumped storage 
units. 
f) Apart from the priced component of each unit’s energy offer function, there can be a non-
priced one (zero marginal cost), , including mandatory hydroelectric injection, power 
injection from renewable units, and power contribution from commissioning units.  
 15 
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g) With reference to the operational cycle of each hydrothermal unit : after a shut-down 
decision has been taken for each unit, it has to remain off (non-operational) for at least  hours, 
i.e., it is associated with specific minimum down time. A certain cost is associated with the shut-
down decision of each unit , .  
h) According to the real non-operational time of each unit , , there are three 
available start-up types  {  when a start-up decision is determined by the 
model. There are specific time limits after which each unit  changes stand-by condition, 
including time before going from hot to warm ( ) and warm to cold stand-by condition ( ) 
respectively. After the determination of the appropriate start-up type decision, each unit enters the 
synchronization phase followed by the soak phase, which have a duration of  and  
hours respectively, during which phases unit’s power output is zero and  respectively. The 
duration of both phases is dependent on the selected start-up type decision . After the 
completion of the soak phase, each unit  enters the dispatchable phase, wherein its power 
output range from its technical minimum, , to its technical maximum, , or from  to 
 , if that unit is selected for providing secondary reserve. During that phase, each unit is 
characterized by specific up, , and down, , ramp rates, or, , when providing secondary 
reserve (up and down). The last operational stage of each unit  is that of desynchronization 
with a duration of  hours. A unit  is considered operational when it operates in each 
one of the aforementioned phases, i.e., synchronization, soak, dispatch and desynchronization. The 
total operational time of each unit must be greater than or equal to its minimum up time,  in order 
to be allowed to shut-down. The different phases of a thermal unit are represented in Figure 3. 
 16 
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Figure 3: Different phases of the operation of a thermal unit (MW) 
 
 
i) The power system’s requirements include: (i) electricity demand requirements in each 
subsystem and time period, , (ii) primary-up reserve requirements in each time period, , (iii) 
secondary-up, , and secondary-down, , reserve requirements in each time period, (iv) 
fast secondary-up, , and fast secondary-down, , reserve requirements in each time 
period, and (v) tertiary reserve requirements in each time period, . 
j) When it comes to power reserve provision capabilities, each unit  is identified based 
on: (i) upper bound on the provision of primary reserve, , (ii) upper bound on the provision of 
secondary reserve, , (iii) upper bound on the provision of tertiary spinning, , and non-
spinning reserve, . Each unit’s energy reserve offer has a certain price, i.e.,  for the 
primary energy reserve, and  for the secondary range energy offer, while tertiary energy offer 
is non-priced. 
 17 
 17 
k) The electricity demand is considered to be responsive to price signals. The final consumers 
respond to fluctuations of the , when a tolerance level  is activated for a customer type 
. This tolerance concerns the percentage of change between the  and the . 
Practically, when final consumers find a price spike, positive or negative, where they respond by 
decreasing or increasing respectively their consumption.  
Based on the above considerations, we proceed with the simulations results. For the purpose 
of our study we implement a Monte Carlo analysis, assuming a ± 20% deviation over its reference 
prices (Dagoumas and Polemis, 2017). In the following figures the simulation results (compared to 
the baseline scenario) of the total electricity demand and the SMP evolution over a 24hour period are 
portrayed. From the inspection of Figure 4, it is obvious that the day-ahead electricity market is 
characterized from non-linearity in the effect of demand response.  
Figure 4: Simulated demand curve evolution over a 24-hour period (Euro/MWh) 
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This finding which has also been found to other studies (see Dagoumas and Polemis, 2017), 
stipulates that electricity demand in Greece follows an inverted-M shape. In other words, the 
simulated pattern implies that total electricity demand is characterized by strong cyclicality effects. 
Based on the existence of such effects, a decrease in electricity consumption is evident late at nights 
or early in the evening. On the contrary, electricity demand spikes are existent during the day or late 
in the evening hours. This result raises important policy implications in terms of market regulation 
toward a more effective electricity management in Greece. Specifically, the existence of a cyclical 
pattern in the electricity demand is important primarily to the Transmission System Operator (TSO) 
which must match electricity supply to demand in real time. Changes in electricity demand levels are 
generally predictable and have daily, weekly, and seasonal patterns. In this case, electricity demand 
levels rise throughout the day and tend to be highest during a block of hours ("on-peak") which 
usually occurs between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on weekdays and lower during the “off-peak” hours 
( between 22:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and during the weekends). Moreover, a stable predictable pattern 
of electricity demand is also useful to the regulator which may lower any discrepancies in the 
transmission system (i.e brown outs) in order to achieve one of its primary goals namely the energy 
security supply. Lastly, the existence of an inverted-M shape curve in the electricity consumption, 
may also affect the electricity supply side since the stakeholders of a power plant (i.e investors, 
stockholders, etc) may address the demand fluctuations in a more efficient way. Similarly, the SMP 
follows a non-monotonic pattern during the 24hour period (see Figure 5). However, in this case, 
cyclicality effects are absent. This raises important implications. Firstly, similarly to other studies 
(see for instance Lu et, al, 2018; Dagoumas and Polemis, 2017; Koltsakis et, al, 2016) a linear 
fluctuation of total electricity demand, due to demand response, leads to non-linear evolution the 
SMP. Secondly, the non-linear evolution of SMP is strongly linked to a number of factors such as the 
marginal cost of the power plants, the bidding strategies of the market players during the Day Ahead 
Market and finally the technical characteristics of the power generators.          
 19 
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Figure 5: Simulated SMP variation over a 24-hour period (Euro/MWh) 
 
 
 Based on the simulation results of the MILP some important policy implications emerge. 
First, the non-monotonic relationship between aggregate demand (appeared in an inverted-M shape) 
and the evolution of intra-day SMP (expressed in a non-cyclical pattern), stimulates risk for the 
incumbent firms in the retail segment of the industry (i.e retailers, suppliers, importers and exporters 
of electricity). This outcome might lead even to short-term losses for some short-term periods, 
affecting strongly the variability of the undertakings. Moreover, this may negatively affect the 
decision of the private firms to enter the Greek electricity industry by incurring high market entry 
and investment costs. Second, the MILP model provides the necessary price signals on the 
profitability of retailers, in their effort to formulate the necessary tariff rates. In this case, the 
proposed model may act as a pivotal study in order to uncover possible distortions and flaws of the 
Day Ahead Market. Third, the model is also useful for policy makers, government officials and 
regulatory bodies (i.e. transmission and distribution system operators), considering that it identifies 
the effect of demand responsiveness to the fluctuations of wholesale prices (SMP). Moreover, it 
shapes the electricity demand pattern in Greece and the formulation of the SMP during the daily hour 
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fluctuations giving important level of information to the market participants (incumbent, independent 
power plants, retailers, etc) and the possible entrants.         
5.  Conclusions  
In this paper, we present a MILP model for the optimal long-term electricity planning of the 
Greek wholesale generation system. In order to capture more accurately the technical characteristics 
of the problem, we have divided the Greek territory into a number of individual interacted networks 
(zones). The proposed model determines the optimal planning of the wholesale electricity market, 
the selection of the power generation technologies, the type of fuels and the plant locations so as to 
meet the expected electricity demand and possible environmental concerns. Despite the fact that the 
formulations of the model components are not introduced for the first time in the literature, their 
combination form a model with many significant parameters and restrictions suitable for policy 
modelling. For this reason, we assure that the model was implemented and thoroughly tested on a 
real data set from a recently liberalized electricity market.  
Based on the above analysis, we argue that the Greek wholesale electricity market is a day-
ahead mandatory pool scheme that provides a day ahead firm price based upon the supply/demand 
balance that ensures efficient short term dispatch taking in to account generation unit constraints, 
reserve requirements and a simplified transmission system zonal constraint mechanism. The day-
ahead procedure (Day Ahead Market Clearing) produces a SMP for each settlement period (one 
hour) and a 24 hour production schedule for each unit. The solution of the day-ahead procedure is 
based on the co-optimization of the energy offers (energy market) and reserve offers (balancing 
market) in order to satisfy the energy demand and reserve requirements, while the transmission 
system zonal constraint mechanism will introduce an additional constraint. A regulated SMP price 
cap will be determined in order to prevent excessive price spikes in the event that insufficient 
capacity is declared available to meet the demand. Offers will be firm at the day-ahead market. 
Generators must maintain their availability as declared and be able to generate at the level set 
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according to their day-ahead schedule. Changes in availability will result in an exposure to the 
imbalance price. Likewise, levels of demand declared by suppliers will also be firm and deviations 
will be liable for settlement at the imbalance price. Therefore, during the Day Ahead Settlement, 
generators are paid at the day-ahead SMP for their scheduled generation while there is no 
remuneration for the scheduled reserves. On the other hand, suppliers pay the day ahead SMP for 
their declared load. 
Lastly, the proposed model provides useful insights into the risk of retailers and therefore acts 
as a pivotal study to policy makers and practitioners (i.e. regulators, TSO, DSO) active in the Greek 
electricity market.  
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Appendix A  
 
Nomenclature 
1. General Symbols and Indexes  
x: real variables 
y, dy: integer variables 
t: Dispatch Period (t = 1,2, .., 24) 
s: priced energy blocks of generation offers or Load Declarations (s = 1,2, …, 10) 
u: dispatchable generation units  
r: refers to non-priced generation (e.g. RES, CHP, must-run hydro etc.) 
u(hydro): refers to hydroelectric generation units (subset of u) 
pm: refers to pumped storage units 
i: refers to the prohibited (due to oscillations) generation level zones 
pp: refers to Load Representatives that submit priced Load Declarations 
p: refers to Load Representatives that submit non-priced Load Declarations 
j: refers to importers 
k: refers to exporters 
con: refers to contracted units 
m: interconnection nodes 
z: refers to system’s zones 
α: refers to loss factor 
PR: refers to primary reserve  
SEC: refers to secondary reserve  
ST, NST: refers to spinning and non spinning tertiary reserve  
TER: refers to system tertiary reserve requirements 
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Table A1: Variable description  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION CODE SYMBOL 
Real Variables 
zt
pps
x ,  Priced load of block s, in the Load Declaration of Load Representative pp, 
to be satisfied in zone z during the Dispatch Period t. 

s
zt
pps
x ,  = DASQpt 
zt
px
,
 Non Priced load to be satisfied in zone z during the Dispatch Period t, 
corresponding to the Load Declaration of Load Representative p.   
DASQpt  
(1 grade only) 
zt
ks
x ,  Dispatched quantity of the offer block s of the exporter k to be exported 
from an interconnection node of zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.   

s
zt
ks
x , = DASQkmt 
zt
pms
x ,  Priced load to be satisfied in zone z during the Dispatch Period t, 
corresponding to the Load Declaration of the pumped storage unit pm.   
- 
zt
js
x ,  Dispatched quantity of the offer block s of the importer j to be injected in 
an interconnection node of zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.   

s
zt
js
x , =DASQjmt 
zt
rx
,
 
Dispatched non-priced quantity of the generation unit r, located in zone z, 
during the Dispatch Period t.   

s
zt
rx
,
=DASQrt 
zt
conx
,
 
Dispatched quantity of the contracted generation unit u, located in zone z, 
during the Dispatch Period t.   
- 
zt
us
x ,  Dispatched quantity of the offer block s of the generation unit u, located in 
zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.   

s
zt
us
x , = DASQut 
zt
PR u
x
,
 Generation quantity reserve corresponding to the Primary Reserve for the 
generation unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.   
- 
ztup
SEC u
x
,
 
Generation quantity reserve corresponding to the upward Secondary 
Reserve range for the generation unit u, located in zone z, during the 
Dispatch Period t. 
- 
ztdw
SEC u
x
,
 
Generation decrease corresponding to the downward Secondary Reserve 
range for the generation unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch 
Period t. 
- 
zt
ST regu
x
,
 
Generation quantity reserve corresponding to the Tertiary Spinning 
Reserve for the generation unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch 
Period t.   
- 
zt
NST reg
u
x
,
 
Generation quantity reserve corresponding to Tertiary non-Spinning 
Reserve for the generation unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch 
Period t.   
- 
Integer Variables 
zt
uy
,
 
Commitment status of generation unit u, located in zone z, during the 
Dispatch Period t  (1: online, 0: offline) 
- 
zt
AGC u
y
,
 
AGC operating mode status for provision of Secondary Reserve) of - 
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generation unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.    
(1: operation in AGC mode, 0: operation not in AGC mode) 
zt
DEC u
y
,
 
Decommissioning status of  generation unit u, located in zone z, during the 
Dispatch Period t  
(1: the unit has just been decommitted, 0: all other statuses) 
- 
zt
COMu
dy
,
 
Auxiliary integer variable denoting change in the operating status of  
generation unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t  
(2: from offline to online, 1: no change, 0: from online to offline).  
- 
zt
DECu
dy
,
 
Auxiliary integer variable denoting change in the operating status of  
generation unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t   
(2: from online to offline, 1: no change, 0: from offline to online).  
- 
i
uu
dz  Auxiliary integer variable to formulate the either-or constraints for the 
prohibited zones of a hydro electric unit. 
- 
Dependent Variables 
tSMP  System’s Marginal Price for the Dispatch Period t.   DASMPt 
tLMP1  Locational Marginal Price in zone 1, for the Dispatch Period t.   - 
tLMP2
 
Locational Marginal Price in zone 2, for the Dispatch Period t.   - 
t
zzx 21  Transmission flow from zone 1 to zone 2 during the Dispatch Period t.   - 
t
zzx 12  Transmission flow from zone 2 to zone 1 during the Dispatch Period t.   - 
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Table A2: Input variables  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION CODE SYMBOL 
capP  Price Cap - 
zt
pps
P ,  Bid price of the load block s in the Load Declaration of Load 
Representative pp in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.   
- 
zt
ks
P ,  
Bid Price of the generation block s in the Load Declaration of 
the exporter k to be exported from an interconnection node in 
zone z, during the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
zt
pms
P ,  Bid price of the load block s in the Load Declaration of pumped 
storage unit pm, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.   
- 
zt
js
P ,  
Price of the generation block s in the Injection Offer of importer 
j to be imported from an interconnection node in zone z, during 
the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
usyn
P  Start up cost of unit u - 
zt
us
P ,  
Offer Price for the generation block s in the Injection Offer of 
generation unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period 
t. 
STEPPsut 
zt
PR u
P
,
 
Offer Price for the generation block corresponding to the 
Primary Reserve of the generation unit u, located in zone z, 
during the Dispatch Period t.    
- 
zt
SECu
P
,
 
Offer Price for the block corresponding to the Secondary 
Reserve range of the generation unit u, located in zone z, during 
the Dispatch Period t.    
- 
zt
u NST
P
,
 
Offer Price for the generation corresponding to non-spinning 
Tertiary Reserve of the generation unit u, located in zone z, 
during the Dispatch Period t.    
- 
t
pa  
Loss factor applied to the non-priced load, located in zone z and 
declared by the Load representative p, during the Dispatch 
Period t.    
- 
t
ppa  
Loss factor applied to the priced load, located in zone z and 
declared by the Load representative pp, during the Dispatch 
Period t.    
- 
t
ka  
Loss factor applied to the quantity to be exported by the 
exporter k from an interconnection node in zone z, during the 
Dispatch Period t.    
- 
t
pma  
Loss factor applied to the load declared by the pumped storage 
unit pm, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.    
- 
t
u
a  Loss factor applied to the quantity generated by the generation 
unit u, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.    
- 
t
j
a  Loss factor applied to the quantity to be imported by the 
importer j from an interconnection node in zone z, during the 
- 
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Dispatch Period t.    
t
con
a  Loss factor applied to the quantity generated by the contracted 
unit con, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.    
- 
t
r
a  Loss factor applied to the non-priced quantity generated by the 
unit r, located in zone z, during the Dispatch Period t.    
- 
21 zzFL   Limit of transmission flow from zone 1 to zone 2.  - 
12 zzFL   Limit of transmission flow from zone 2 to zone 1.  - 
t
mExp
IntC  Interconnection transfer capability for exports at node m, during 
the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
t
mExp
IntC
*
 Interconnection transfer capability for exports for the set of 
nodes m*, during the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
t
mimp
IntC  Interconnection transfer capability for imports at node m, 
during the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
t
mimp
IntC
*
 Interconnection transfer capability for imports for the set of 
nodes m*, during the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
t
sysexp  Total system export capability, during the Dispatch Period t. - 
t
sysimp  Total system import capability, during the Dispatch Period t. - 
t
PRQ  
Total system requirements for Primary Reserve, during the 
Dispatch Period t. 
- 
tup
SECQ  
Total system requirements for upward Secondary Reserve, 
during the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
tdw
SECQ  
Total system requirements for downward Secondary Reserve, 
during the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
up
sysR  System’s overall ramp-up rate capability  - 
dw
sysR  System’s overall ramp-down rate capability  - 
treg
TERQ  
System requirements for Tertiary Reserve in geographical 
region reg, during the Dispatch Period t. 
- 
u
Qmin  Technical minimum of unit u. - 
u
Qmax  Technical maximum output capability of unit u. - 
up
uR  Rump-up rate of unit u - 
dw
uR  Rump-down rate of unit u - 
AGC
u
Qmin  Technical minimum of unit u, in AGC mode. - 
AGC
u
Qmax  Technical maximum output capability of unit u, in AGC mode. - 
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uAGC
RR  Rump rate of unit u, in AGC mode. - 
uE  Total daily production capability of the hydroelectric unit u. - 
lwi
uFZ
,
 
Lower limit of the prohibited continuous operation zone i (due 
to oscillations), of the hydroelectric unit u. 
- 
upi
uFZ
,
 
Upper limit of the prohibited continuous operation zone i (due 
to oscillations), of the hydroelectric unit u. 
- 
zt
us
Q ,  
Generation quantity of block s in the Injection Offer of 
generation unit u, located in zone z, located in zone z, during 
the Dispatch Period t. 

s
zt
us
Q , =STEPQsut 
zt
PRu
Q
,
 
Generation quantity corresponding to the Offer for Primary 
Reserve of generation unit u, located in zone z, during the 
Dispatch Period t.    
- 
zt
SECu
Q
,
 
Quantity corresponding to the Offer for Secondary Reserve 
range of generation unit u, located in zone z, during the 
Dispatch Period t.    
- 
t
uAGC
R  Ramp Rate of unit u, in AGC mode, during the Dispatch Period 
t. 
- 
zt
uNST
Q
,
 
Generation quantity corresponding to non-spinning Tertiary 
Reserve capability of generation unit u, located in zone z, 
during the Dispatch Period t.    
- 
dw
ut min
 Minimum down time of generation unit u - 
up
ut min
 Minimum up time of generation unit u - 
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Appendix B 
Two variables with no cost assignment are introduced at the end of the objective function corresponding to the total energy transferred from one zone to 
the other. In fact these variables are dependent each other: when one of them is greater than zero the other is set equal to zero. The objective function is of 
the following form: 
max 








   
    
con
con
cap
zt
con
r
r
zt
r
t z
j
j
s
s
zt
j
zt
j
pm
pm
s
s
zt
pm
zt
pm
k
k
s
s
zt
k
zt
kcap
p
p
zt
p
pp
pp
s
s
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Appendix C 
Unit Constraints 
Unit constraints are the set of constraints that concern each unit that participates in the Day-Ahead 
Scheduling and refer to minimum and maximum generation output capability, ramp-up and ramp-down 
capability, reserves for ancillary services, commitment and decommitment statuses and some special 
restrictions for hydroelectric units.  
Synchronization Status Constraints 
Constraint (C1) refers to the online/offline status of each unit, defining whether for the certain Dispatch 
Period t, the unit provides energy and reserve for ancillary services. More specifically, for each Dispatch 
Period t, the binary variable y t,zu denotes if the unit is synchronized or not. If this variable is set equal to 
zero (unit not synchronized) then all the other variables of the constraint, which correspond to the energy 
blocks and the reserve quantities for ancillary services, are also set equal to zero since the coefficient M of 
the variable is a sufficiently big number (e.g. one thousand times the largest value of the technological 
parameters and the right hind side of the mathematical problem). Its value is in purpose set, so that all the 
variables take zero values each time the binary variable is equal to zero. In case that the binary variable is 
equal to 1 (unit synchronized) then it is obvious that all the left-hand side of the constraint will be 
negative due to the very big value of the coefficient M. When the binary variable is equal to 1, at least the 
technical minimum of the unit is dispatched. 
tu,  0,
,,,,
1
, 

Myxxxxx ztu
zt
uST
ztup
SEC
ztdw
SEC
zt
uPR
s
s
zt
u uus
 (C1)  
Technical Minimum Constraints with/without Automatic Generation Control (AGC) 
Constraint (C2), which is related with the technical minimum of the unit and the Automatic Generation 
Control mode operation for secondary control provision, has a twofold scope. First, it does not allow the 
binary variable y t,zAGCu which indicates if the unit operates in AGC mode (y
 t,z
AGCu = 1), to take value equal 
to 1, when the synchronization status variable (y t,zu) is set to offline (equal to zero).  
tu,  0min
,
1
,
min
, 

AGC
u
zt
AGC
s
s
zt
u
zt
u usu
QyxQy     (C2) 
Second, when the unit operates in AGC mode (y t,zAGCu = 1) the technical minimum of the unit has a 
different value (Qmin
AGC
u); in that case, constraint (21) artificially increases the technical minimum by 
setting the difference of the two minimums as a quantity that will be included in the variables that 
correspond to the energy blocks.  
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Maximum Capacity Constraints with/without Automatic Generation Control (AGC) 
This constraint restrains the sum of all the variables that represent generation to exceed the technical 
maximum of the unit (Qmaxu), for each Dispatch Period t. This is also restrained in the case where the unit 
operates in AGC mode and the technical maximum has a different value (Qmax
AGC
u). 
tu,   
uuusu
QQQyxxxxQy AGC
u
zt
AGC
zt
uST
zt
u
up
SEC
zt
uPR
s
s
zt
u
zt
u maxmaxmax
,,,,
1
,
min
, 

    (C3) 
 
Ramp-Up and Ramp-Down Capability Constraints 
Constraint (C4) refers to the ramp-up capability rate of a generation unit and restrains the unit from 
increasing its generation output more than its technical capability within a Dispatch Period. It is valid 
when the unit operates in both normal and AGC mode, where the ramp-up rate capability has a different 
value. 
tu,          upuuztAGCupu
s
s
zt
u
s
s
zt
u
RRRyRxx
uAGCss




,
1
,1
1
,
   (C4) 
Respectively, constraint (C5) refers to the ramp-down capability rate of a generation unit and restrains the 
unit from decreasing its generation output more than its technical capability within a Dispatch Period. It is 
also valid when the unit operates in normal and AGC mode. 
tu,         dwuuztAGCdwu
s
s
zt
u
s
s
zt
u
RRRyRxx
uAGCss


 ,
1
,
1
,1
   (C5) 
Special Constraints concerning the Hydroelectric Units 
Constraint (C6) refers to the total generation capability of a hydroelectric unit within a Dispatch Day and 
restrains the unit to be dispatched for a quantity than it cannot generate that Dispatch Day. The constraint 
takes into account both the quantities included in the Injection Offer of the unit and the non-priced (must-
run hydro) quantities that have to be generated by the same unit. 
hydrou      u
zt
r
t
s
s
zt
u
Exx
hydroshydro
 
 
)( ,
24
1 1
,
) )((
  (C6) 
The second constraint (C7) refers to the prohibited (due to oscillations) generation level zones i for the 
hydroelectric units and restrains the total generation output of the unit, for each Dispatch Period t, from 
being within these zones (where M is a sufficiently big number). 
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ituhydro ,,       MdzFZx iulwiu
s
s
zt
us


1,
1
,
    (C7) 
ituhydro ,,     MdzFZx
i
u
upi
u
s
s
zt
us


,
1
,
  (C8) 
Ancillary Services Reserve Constraints  
The following constraint (C9), for each Dispatch Period t, does not allow assigning to the unit primary 
reserve more than the quantity that represents unit’s capability to provide primary reserve (according its 
Techno-economic Declaration) and is included in its Reserve Offer (QPRI 
t,z
u). If the unit is not dispatched, 
the primary reserve quantity is automatically set equal to zero. 
tu,  0
,,, 
zt
PR
zt
u
zt
uPR u
Qyx     (C9) 
Similarly, for each Dispatch Period t, constraint (C10) does not allow assigning to the unit secondary 
reserve more than the range that represents unit’s capability to provide secondary reserve (according its 
Techno-economic Declaration) and is included in its Reserve Offer (QSEC 
t,z
u). If the unit is not dispatched 
or the unit does not operate in AGC mode (the binary variable yAGC
t.z
u = 0), the secondary reserve range is 
automatically set equal to zero. 
tu,  0)(
,,,,

zt
SEC
zt
uAGC
ztdwztup
uuSECuSEC
Qyxx       (C10) 
Constraints (C11) and (C12) assure that for each Dispatch Period t the downward or upward variation in 
the generation output for the provision of secondary control will not exceed the ramp rate (expressed in 
MW per hour) of the unit whet it operates in AGC mode (RRAGCu). 
tu,
 0
,,

u
uSEC
AGC
zt
uAGC
ztup RRyx  (C11) 
tu,
 0
,,

uuSEC
AGC
zt
uAGC
ztdw RRyx  (C12) 
The next constraint (C13), set for each Dispatch Period t, does not allow any decrease in unit’s generation 
output for the provision of secondary reserve that would led the generation level below the technical 
minimum of the unit. 
tu,      0)( min
,,
1
, 

AGCztdw
SEC
zt
uAGC
s
s
zt
u uus
Qxyx  (C13) 
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Constraint (C14) assures that the non-spinning reserve that a unit may provide within the Dispatch 
Period t does not exceed its corresponding capability. Also, it excludes the unit from the provision of non 
spinning tertiary reserve if the unit is dispatched. 
tu,
 
zt
uNST
zt
uNST
zt
u
zt
uNST
QQyx
,,,, 
    (C14) 
Constraint (C15) does not allow the quantity of the non spinning reserve provided by a unit during the 
Dispatch Period t, to be less than the technical minimum of the unit. 
tu,
 
0min
,

u
Qx
zt
uNST     (C15) 
Unit Commitment Constraints 
For every unit and Dispatch Period t, the commissioning (dytCOM) and decommissioning (dy
t
DEC) indicator 
dependent (integer) auxiliary variables are calculated (C16, C17). The possible values for the first one 
(dytCOM) is either 0 (decommissioning), 1 (the unit remains online or offline) or 2 (commissioning). 
Respectively for the second variable (dytDEC) the possible values are either 0 (commissioning), 1 (the unit 
remains online or offline) or 2 (decommissioning). 
 
tu,
     0)1( 1  tu
t
u
t
uCOM
yydy  (C16) 
tu,
      0)1( 1   tu
t
u
t
uDEC
yydy  (C17) 
For every Dispatch Period t, if a unit is synchronized the constraint (C18) does not allow to the unit to 
desynchronize before the minimum up time is elapsed.  
tu,
    0)1(...
min
min
)1(

 up
u
t
uCOM
tt
u
t
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   (C18)      
Respectively constraint (C19), if a unit is desynchronized the constraint (C20) does not allow to the unit to 
synchronize before the minimum down time is elapsed. 
tu,
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In the objective function these two auxiliary variables are not used but another dependent binary variable 
(yDEC
t
u) is used instead. Constraint (38) actually links each dyDEC variable with the corresponding yDEC 
variable and at the same time keeps the binary character of yDEC.  
tu,
    0)1( 
t
uDEC
t
uDEC
dyy    (C20)      
Other Constraints  
The following constraints set for every unit the first dispatched quantity variable (x1) less than or equal to the 
difference between the first block in the Injection Offer and the technical minimum of the unit.  
ut,       u
QQx zt
u
zt
u min
,,
11

 (C21) 
For the rest variables (xu
t,z
s) that correspond to the dispatched quantities of every offered block they can not 
exceed the maximum quantity offered per block (Qu
t,z
s). 
sut ,,  
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u
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       s=2,…, 10 (C22) 
For the contracted units the dispatched quantities must be less than or equal to the contracted ones. 
cont,  ztcon
zt
con Qx
,,          (C23) 
All the variables must be greater than or equal to zero and the integer binary variables equal to or less than: 
sut ,,
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Finally: Zdydyyyy
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